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J. D. Geanakoplos and H. M. Polemarchakis (1986) prove the generic constrained subop-
timality of equilibrium allocations in two period economies with incomplete markets. They
perturb asset prices at equilibrium when the degree of market incompleteness equals one.
However, since prices are not fundamentals that parameterize the economy, a generic result
cannot be obtained in such a way. In these notes we provide complete and detailed ver-
sion of their proof in which the arguments do not depend on the dimension of the market
incompleteness and in which utilities and endowments are perturbed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
J. D. Geanakoplos and H. M. Polemarchakis (1986)—henceforth, GP—showed that
when real assets are traded in two-period economies with more than a single good, and
markets are incomplete, then the equilibrium allocation is constrained suboptimal, i.e.,
even if the “planner” is restricted to using only the existing assets to obtain the realloca-
tion, he is able to induce an improvement over the equilibrium allocation. This result has
become a cornerstone for subsequent research in the area; in particular, it sheds light into
the open question of analyzing the optimality of equilibrium allocations in pure exchange
OLG economies with sequentially incomplete markets when price eﬀects are allowed for.
The key feature of the proof by GP is to show that (i) with incomplete markets,
the ratios of marginal utilities of income across states diﬀer generically across agents, a
result which they use to show that (ii) with more than a single commodity, a price eﬀect
can be induced in such a way as to cause a welfare improvement. To prove result (i)
above, GP perturb asset prices at equilibrium when the degree of market incompleteness
equals one. However, since prices are not fundamentals that parameterize the economy,
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1a generic result cannot be obtained in such a way. Accordingly we provide, in section 5,
an alternative proof of result (i) above which does not depend on the dimension of the
market incompleteness and in which utilities and endowments are perturbed.
Also, the original proof by GP of result (ii) above, though correct and brilliant, skips
many details in order to shorten the presentation. We believe that understanding the
problem requires one to have the relevant details and, accordingly, provide them and
complete the arguments following the sketches given by GP. In this respect, our endeavor
pursues to allow the reader to appreciate better the nature of the contribution of GP.
To prove that a welfare improvement is derived from a relative price eﬀect, one must
show that a property of linear independence is generically satisﬁed for a set of vectors
derived from the income eﬀect vectors.3 To guarantee that this property holds, an upper
bound needs to be imposed on the number of agents, as GP do, which in turn requires that
the number of agents relative to the number of goods in the economy be suﬃciently small.
This is controversial since, from the competitive equilibrium perspective, one usually
has in mind an economy where the number of agents is large relative to the number of
commodities. Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998)—henceforth, CKV—have proved the
GP result without imposing an upper bound on the number of agents. However, their
description of the intervention diﬀers from the one used by GP in that (a) agents are
allowed to retrade the assets allocated at the intervention, and (b) the planner makes
lump-sum transfers in some goods. As we show, the result by CKV follows precisely
because feature (b) allows for a direct control of the income eﬀect vectors.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and no-
tation. Section 3 presents the tools that permit us to analyze the eﬀects of the asset
reallocation. In section 4 we obtain two linear independence results derived from the de-
scription of the economy. Section 5 deals with the marginal utilities of income of the agents
when markets are incomplete. Section 6 presents a technical result on linear algebra, and
section 7 completes the proof.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a multigood, two-period (t = 0,1), exchange economy under uncertainty
in which one state s from a ﬁnite set of states S = {0,1,...,S} occurs at date 1. There is
a ﬁnite set I = {0,1,...,I} of two-period lived agents who consume only at date 1 and
reallocate their income across states by trading securities at date 0. The set of commodities
is L = {0,1,...,L}. Since there are L + 1 commodities available in each state s ∈ S, the
commodity space is Rn with n = (L + 1)(S + 1).
Each agent i ∈ I is described by (i) a consumption set Xi ⊂ Rn, (ii) an initial









ls denotes the endowment of commodity l ∈ L that agent i has
in state s, and (iii) a utility function ui : Xi → R deﬁned over consumption bundles xi :=
3For each agent, an income eﬀect vector reﬂects the changes in his demand of commodities as a









ls denotes the consumption
of commodity l by agent i in state s. Let zi := [xi − ωi] denote the excess demand of
agent i. Let ω := (ω0,ω1,...,ωI) ∈ Rn(I+1) and x := (x0,x1,...,xI) ∈ Rn(I+1) denote,
respectively, a vector of endowments and an allocation of commodities.
There is a set A = {0,1,...,A} of inside real assets which pay a return in terms of
commodity 0 in each state s ∈ S denoted, for a ∈ A, by ra(s) ∈ R. For a ∈ A, we deﬁne
ra := (ra(0),ra(1),...,ra(S)) ∈ RS+1, the payoﬀ vector of asset a. For s ∈ S, we deﬁne




















r0(0) r1(0) ... rA(0)








be the corresponding matrix of returns, of dimension (S + 1) × (A + 1).
We denote the quantity of asset a held by agent i by θi
a ∈ R, a portfolio of agent i
by θi := (θi
0,θi
1,...,θi
A) ∈ RA+1, and an allocation of assets by θ := (θ0,θ1,...,θI) ∈
R(A+1)(I+1).
We assume throughout the paper that
Assumption A.1—Endowments and Preferences of the Agents: For each i ∈ I; (i)
ωi ∈ Rn
++, (ii) ui is C2, strictly increasing, and diﬀerentiably strictly quasi-concave, and
(iii) if Ui(k) := {y ∈ Rn : ui(y) ≥ ui(k)}, then Ui(k) ⊂ Rn
++ for each k ∈ Rn
++.
Assumption A.2—Asset Structure: (i) R has full column rank, (ii) there exists a
portfolio θ ∈ RA+1 such that R   θ > 0,4 (iii) A < S, and (iv) each set of A + 1 rows of
R is linearly independent.
Assumptions A.1 and A.2 are standard. Assumption A.1 (iii) says that the closure of the
indiﬀerence curves of each agent does not intersect the boundary of Rn
+. Also, we have
assumed that the asset market is incomplete, Assumption A.2 (iii), so that if  R  :=  
τ ∈ RS+1 : τ = R   θ, θ ∈ RA+1 
then  R  ⊂ RS+1 with  R   = RS+1, i.e., the asset
structure does not allow agents to transfer income fully across states.
To ease part of the proof we assume that utilities satisfy a vN-M utility form.
Assumption A.3—Additively Separable Utilities: For each agent i ∈ I, there is a
Bernoulli utility function vi : R
L+1








s) for each xi ∈ Xi.
We denote the vector of commodity prices by p := (p0,p1,...,pS) ∈ Rn
+, where ps :=
(p0s,p1s,...,pLs) and pls is the price of commodity l in state s. Let q := (q0,q1,...,qA) ∈
4When comparing two vectors x and y of the same dimension we use the symbols “<”, and “≤” to
indicate xk ≤ yk for each k but x  = y, and xk ≤ yk for each k respectively.
3RA+1 denote the vector of asset prices, where qa is the price of asset a. We choose commod-
ity 0 as numeraire and normalize its price to 1 in each state s ∈ S. Analogously, we nor-
malize the price of asset 0 by setting q0 := 1. Let P :=
 
p ∈ Rn




q ∈ RA+1 : q0 = 1
 
denote, respectively, the normalized price domain for
commodities and for assets.
For two vectors α = (α1,α2,...,αw) and β = (β1,β2,...,βw), with w ∈ N, where, for
each k = 1,...,w, αk and βk lie in some Euclidean space such that the product αk   βk is
well deﬁned, we deﬁne the box product α ￿β := (α1   β1,α2   β2,...,αw   βw).
For a commodity price vector p ∈ P and an asset price vector q ∈ Q, we deﬁne the








A+1 : q   θ
i ≤ 0, p ￿(x
i − ω
i) ≤ R   θ
i 
.
Since we will obtain a generic result, we have to work with a set of economies rather
than with only one. Such a set is obtained via a parameterization of the economy based on
both fundamentals, utilities and endowments. So, the characteristics of the economy are
summarized by the collection of utility functions and endowment vectors of the agents;
let (u,ω) := (u0,...,uI,ω0,...,ωI). We denote the space of utility functions by U and
the space of endowment vectors by Ω. Let Γ := U ×Ω denote the space of economies that
we consider; i.e., we obtain a parameterized family of economies. We say that a set of
economies is generic if it is an open set of full measure in the space Γ.
Now we can deﬁne equilibrium
Definition 1—CE: We say that (x∗,θ∗,p∗,q∗) is a Competitive Equilibrium (CE) of
the economy (u,ω) ∈ Γ if
(i) (a)
 
i(xi∗ − ωi) ≤ 0;
(b)
 
i θi∗ = 0,
(ii) for each i ∈ I;
(a) (xi∗,θi∗) ∈ Bi(p∗,q∗);
(b) if ui(xi) > ui(xi∗) for some xi and some θi, then (xi,θi) / ∈ Bi(p∗,q∗).
For i ∈ I, let (fi,ζi) : P × Q → Xi × RA+1 denote the function deﬁned by the fact





i) subject to q   θ
i ≤ 0 and p ￿(x
i − ω
i) ≤ R   θ
i.
Let the function F : P × Q → Rn deﬁned by F(p,q) :=
 
i[fi(p,q) − ωi] for each
(p,q) ∈ P ×Q denote the aggregate excess demand function for goods with spot-ﬁnancial
markets. Also, let the function Ψ : P×Q → RA+1 deﬁned by Ψ(p,q) :=
 
i ζi(p,q) for each
(p,q) ∈ P ×Q denote the aggregate excess demand function for assets with spot-ﬁnancial
markets.
For a commodity price vector p ∈ P and a portfolio θi ∈ RA+1, we deﬁne the contingent







i : p ￿(x
i − ω
i) ≤ R   θ
i 
.














Definition 2—CM-CE: Given an allocation of assets θ ∈ R(A+1)(I+1) such that  
i θi = 0, we say that (x∗∗,p∗∗) is a Spot Market Competitive Equilibrium (SM-CE) of
the economy (u,ω) ∈ Γ if
(i)
 
i(xi∗∗ − ωi) ≤ 0,
(ii) for each i ∈ I; xi∗∗ = gi(p∗∗,θi).
Let the function G : P × R(A+1)(I+1) → Rn deﬁned by G(p,θ) :=
 
i[gi(p,θi) − ωi] for
each (p,θ) ∈ P ×R(A+1)(I+1) denote the aggregate excess demand function for goods with
spot markets.
Remark 1: Consider a pair (p,q) ∈ P × Q. For each i ∈ I, we have that if (xi,θi) ∈
Bi(p,q), then xi ∈   Bi(p,θi). Therefore, if (x∗,θ∗,p∗,q∗) is a CE, then (x∗,p∗) is a SM-CE
for the asset allocation θ∗.
Remark 2: By invoking Walras’ law, we shall consider markets for just L commodities
in each state, and for A assets; commodity 0 and asset 0 correspond to the “dropped”





truncation of fi, and by   F = (F10,...,FL0,...,F1S,...,FLS) and   Ψ = (Ψ1,...,ΨA),
respectively, the truncation of F and the truncation of Ψ, each of them being deﬁned on





and   G = (G10,...,GL0,...,G1S,...,GLS) denote, respectively, the truncation of gi and
the truncation of G, both of them being deﬁned on the normalized price domain P.













LS) denote, respectively, the truncation of xi, the truncation of
ωi, and the truncation of zi.
The notion of optimality used is the benchmark for incomplete asset markets. It applies
the concept of Pareto eﬃciency to the economy above, but imposing that any alternative
allocation be traded in the existing markets. This yields the criterion of constrained Pareto
optimality, due to Stiglitz (1982), and Newbery and Stiglitz (1982).
Definition 3—CS: An allocation (x,θ) is Constrained Suboptimal (CS) if there exists
an alternative allocation (˜ x, ˜ θ), and a price vector p ∈ P such that
(i) (˜ x,p) is a SM-CE for the asset allocation ˜ θ,
(ii) (a) ui(˜ xi) ≥ ui(xi) for each i ∈ I;
(b) uj(˜ xj) > uj(xj) for some j ∈ I.
So, an allocation is CS if a (benevolent) “central planner” is able, by redistributing agents’
5assets and by allowing agents to retrade only goods, to induce a new equilibrium allocation
of goods that Pareto dominates the original allocation. Of course, there will be also a new
supporting equilibrium price vector associated with the new equilibrium allocation, as
stated in Deﬁnition 3.
We can now state the GP result.
Theorem 1—The GP Result: Assume A.1, A.2, and A.3, and that 0 < 2L ≤ I < LS,
and A ≥ 1. Then there exists a generic set of economies ˜ Γ ⊂ Γ such that, for each economy
(u,ω) ∈ ˜ Γ, each CE is CS.
3. PRELIMINARIES
The objective of this section is to present the problem as one of intervention by a
“central planner” and to introduce the tools which will allow us to interpret its eﬀects on
the agents’ welfare. As a ﬁrst step, we present two results on the generic regularity of the
set of economies described.
To do this, we need ﬁrst to set a notational convention. For any function H parame-
terized by the fundamentals of the economy (u,ω), Hy denotes the function H such that
parameter y ∈ {u,ω,(u,ω)} is ﬁxed; e.g., (  F,   Ψ)(u,ω) denotes the (truncated) aggregate
excess demand function for goods and assets for the speciﬁc economy (u,ω) ∈ Γ, and
(  F,   Ψ)u denotes the (truncated) aggregate excess demand function for goods and assets
for an economy with a ﬁxed utility parameter u ∈ U when the endowment ω ∈ Ω is
allowed to vary.
Proposition 1—Generic Regularity: Assume A.1, A.2 (i) and (ii), then, for each
u ∈ U, there exists a generic set ̺(u) ⊂ Ω such that, for each ω ∈ ̺(u), (  F,   Ψ)u is a
continuously diﬀerentiable function with respect to ω.
Proof: (GP) Q.E.D.
Let Γ1 := {(u,ω) ∈ Γ : u ∈ U,ω ∈ ̺(u)} denote the generic set of economies identiﬁed
in Proposition 1.
Since, by Proposition 1, equilibria are locally isolated (i.e., for each equilibrium, there
is no other equilibrium arbitrarily close to it, so that each equilibrium depends in a contin-
uous manner on the fundamentals of the economy), utility functions can be perturbed by
the addition of a quadratic term in a way such that the linear term subsequently added to
the vector of the ﬁrst derivatives amounts to zero at the equilibrium allocation. Therefore,
the perturbation leaves unaﬀected demand but it changes the matrix of second derivatives
of the utility function. Using this fact, it can be shown that any perturbation of each of
the derivatives Dp  gi, i ∈ I, by the addition of a symmetric matrix, can be induced by
adding a suitably chosen quadratic term to the utility function of agent i.5 GP use this
5See, e.g., Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1980).
6result to prove the next proposition.
Proposition 2—Generic Strong Regularity: Assume A.1, A.2 (i) and (ii), then there
exists a generic set of economies Γ2 ⊂ Γ1 such that, for each (u,ω) ∈ Γ2 and each feasible
asset allocation θ ∈ R(A+1)(I+1), the Jacobian matrix Dp   G(p∗,θ), evaluated at the SM-CE
prices p∗ ∈ P associated with θ, is invertible.
Proof: (GP) Q.E.D.
We will now introduce a (benevolent) “central planner”, who reallocates the existing
assets before trade takes place. After that intervention, agents are allowed to trade in
the markets for goods to the point where a new equilibrium in the commodity markets is
achieved. However, they are not allowed to retrade the portfolio they were assigned; i.e.,
the original equilibrium is a CE and the new equilibrium is a SM-CE associated with the
new asset allocation. We must show that, for a generic set of economies, the allocation of
commodities induced by the new asset reallocation is Pareto improving.
The asset redistribution directly aﬀects the income of the agents and, since more than a
single good is traded, also changes commodity prices in the spot markets at date 1. Both
types of eﬀects change the budget sets of the agents and therefore their consumption
possibilities. However, intuitively we can see that the direct eﬀect of any feasible asset
reallocation on the income of the agents does not permit a Pareto improvement since
only a redistribution of a ﬁxed amount of income takes place, so that improving an agent
necessarily implies harming another. Therefore, we should concentrate on analyzing the
eﬀects on welfare due to the price eﬀect that results from the reallocation of assets.





i) subject to q   θ
i ≤ 0 and p ￿(x
i − ω
i) ≤ R   θ
i.




i   R,
(c2) Dxiu
i(x
i) = p ￿λ
i,
where  i and λi = (λi
0,λi
1,...,λi
S) are, respectively, the Lagrange multipliers correspond-
ing to the budget constraints on assets and on the spot market for agent i in each state s.
From (c2) above, by noting that dui(xi) := Dxiui(xi)   dxi, the change in utility of agent




i   [p ￿dx
i].
Now we can consider the changes induced by such an asset perturbation on the agents’
consumption plans. So, by taking inﬁnitesimal perturbations of θi that induce changes on
7xi and on p, and by computing the total diﬀerential of the contingent spot market budget
constraint of agent i at the solution, we have
(2) p ￿dx
i = R   dθ
i − dp ￿(x
i − ω
i),
a condition that must be satisﬁed by the changes induced by the asset reallocation. Then,




i   R   dθ
i − λ
i   (x
i − ω
i) ￿dp.
The ﬁrst element in equation (3) above reﬂects the direct eﬀect of the asset reallocation
on the utility of agent i due to a perturbation of his income, and the second reﬂects the
contribution due to the change in relative prices. We turn now to a more detailed analysis
of this price eﬀect.
Consider an initial CE (x∗,θ∗,p∗,q∗) of an economy (u,ω) ∈ Γ2. By noting Remark 1
and that the budget constraints of problem (P) above hold with equality at the solution,
given Assumption A.1, we have that   G(p∗,θ∗) = 0. Now, by considering inﬁnitesimal
perturbations on p∗ and on θ∗, and by computing the total diﬀerential, we obtain
Dp   G(p
∗,θ
∗)   dp + Dθ   G(p
∗,θ
∗)   dθ = 0.
From the Strong Regularity result, Proposition 2, we know that, for economies (u,ω) ∈ Γ2,
Dp   G(p∗,θ∗) is invertible so that, by applying the Implicit Function Theorem,
(4) dp = −
 




  Dθ   G(p
∗,θ
∗)   dθ
holds in a neighborhood of the initial SM-CE (x∗,p∗) associated with θ∗. Hence, our
problem has been reduced to specifying an asset perturbation where the change in utility
of each agent i ∈ I is given by (3), and the change in prices is determined by the matrix
Dθ   G(p∗,θ∗), of dimension L(S + 1) × (A + 1)(I + 1), that appears in equation (4).
For the original SM-CE (x∗,p∗) associated with the initial asset allocation θ∗, by ap-
plying equation (3) combined with equation (4) to each agent i ∈ I (considering truncated
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8with   λ being of dimension (I +1)×(S +1)(I +1),   R being of dimension (S +1)(I +1)×
(A + 1)(I + 1), and ψ(x∗) being of dimension L(S + 1)(I + 1) × (I + 1).
For the given SM-CE (x∗,p∗), and for θ∗, let O(x∗,p∗,θ∗) denote the matrix, of di-




∗) :=   λ
∗   ψ(x
∗) ￿
 




  Dθ   G(p
∗,θ
∗).
Also, for i ∈ I, let V i
s(p∗) = (V i
1s(p∗),...,V i
Ls(p∗)) ∈ RL denote the vector of income













s := r(s)   θ
i for i ∈ I and s ∈ S,
the change, at the given SM-CE, on the demand of good l ∈ L\{0} by agent i in state s due
an inﬁnitesimal change of his income in that state. We set V i(p∗) := (V i
0(p∗),...,V i
S(p∗)) ∈











the matrix Dθ  gi(p∗,θi∗), of dimension L(S + 1) × (A + 1)(I + 1), can be written as





0 ... 0 r0 ￿V i(p∗) r1 ￿V i(p∗) ... rA ￿V i(p∗) 0 ... 0
 
,
where the non-null columns correspond to the changes in the demand of agent i due to
the changes in the portfolio of that agent while the null vectors correspond to the changes
induced by the variations in the portfolio of agents other than i.
We turn now to specify the asset reallocation that we consider.
The proposed asset reallocation is such that agent 0 gifts asset 0 to each agent j ∈ I\{0}
and gifts asset 1 to agent 1. Let τj
a ∈ R denote a transfer of asset a that agent j ∈ I \{0}
receives from agent 0. The changes in asset holdings associated with the asset reallocation



















0 ,0,0,...,0) for each m ∈ I \ {0,1},





1) denote a vector of asset transfers that must be chosen to lie in the
space of transfers T := RI+1.
Remark 3: By using the proposed asset reallocation, for each ∆θ ∈ R(A+1)(I+1), there
is a unique τ ∈ T that fully speciﬁes ∆θ.
9With this intervention, by noting (7), we obtain the changes induced in the demand
of the agents:




0 − r1 ￿V 0(p∗)τ1
1;
(b) Dθ  g1(p∗,θ1∗)   ∆θ = r0 ￿V 1(p∗)τ1
0 + r1 ￿V 1(p∗)τ1
1;
(c) Dθ  gm(p∗,θm∗)   ∆θ = r0 ￿V m(p∗)τm
0 for each m ∈ I \ {0,1}.
Then, since Dθ   G(p∗,θ∗)   ∆θ =
 
i Dθ  gi(p∗,θi∗)   ∆θ, we obtain, for an asset reallocation
∆θ speciﬁed by means τ ∈ T ,
(8) Dθ   G(p
∗,θ
∗)   ∆θ = A(p
∗)   τ,




r0 ￿ [V 1(p∗) − V 0(p∗)] r0 ￿
 
V I(p∗) − V 0(p∗)
 
r1 ￿ [V 1(p∗) − V 0(p∗)]
 
.
From equation (5), using the matrix speciﬁed in (6), and taking into account the











So, our objective is to analyze whether for a generic set of economies the rank of matrix
(  λ∗     R + O(x∗,p∗,θ∗)), of dimension (I + 1) × (A + 1)(I + 1), equals (I + 1) so that, by
choosing appropriately the vector ∆θ, any du(x∗) ∈ RI+1 can be generated. A standard
argument shows that the rank of matrix   λ∗     R cannot be I +1 since it only captures the
eﬀect of a pure redistribution of income. It follows that to prove Theorem 1, it suﬃces to
show that matrix O(x∗,p∗,θ∗) has rank I + 1 for a generic set of economies. By noting
Remark 3 and by using (6) together with (8), we obtain that, for each ∆θ ∈ R(A+1)(I+1),




∗)   ∆θ =   λ
∗   ψ(x
∗) ￿
 





∗)   τ.





∗) :=   λ
∗   ψ(x
∗) ￿
 






where A(p∗) is the matrix speciﬁed in (9), has rank I+1 for a generic set of economies. To






k yk = 1
 
such that δ   Φ(x∗,p∗,θ∗) = [0]T.
The proof will be completed in two steps.
Step 1: We will show, in Proposition 4, that generically any matrix obtained by dropping
from A(p∗) the vectors that correspond to any state has rank I + 1.
Step 2: We will show in section 7 that, for δ ∈ ∆I+1, by suitably perturbing (u,ω), we
can alter as we wish at least LS entries (that correspond to at least S states) of the
10vector δ   λ∗  ψ(x∗) ￿[Dp   G(p∗,θ∗)]−1, leaving [Dp   G(p∗,θ∗)]−1 unchanged. To do so, we use
a result from linear algebra provided in Lemma 1, together with (i) the result on linear
independence given in Proposition 3, and (ii) the property in Proposition 5, whereby there
is a set of L+1 agents {i0,i1,...,iL} ⊂ I, such that, given δ := (δi0,δi1,...,δiL) ∈ ∆L+1,
generically, 0  = δi0   λi0
s
∗  = δim   λim
s
∗ for at least S states, for each m ∈ {1,2,...,L}.
4. LINEAR INDEPENDENCE OF THE INCOME EFFECTS
In this section we obtain two properties of linear independence that the set of vec-
tors
 
V 0,V 1,...,V I 
generically satisﬁes. These results require that L > 0 and that
preferences not be quasi-linear since otherwise income eﬀects are absent.
Proposition 3: Assume A.1, A.2 (i) and (ii), then, for each subset of L + 1 agents,






















is linearly independent, for a CE price p∗ of an economy in some generic set Γ3 ⊂ Γ.
Proof: Consider an arbitrary subset of L + 1 agents {i0,i1,...,iL} ⊂ I, and a given





s (p∗) − V i0
s (p∗) V i2
s (p∗) − V i0
s (p∗) ... V iL




and let σs : P × Q × ∆L → RL(S+1) × RA × RL be the function speciﬁed by
σs(p,q,δ) :=
 
(  F,   Ψ)(p,q),δ   Πs(p
∗)
 
for each (p,q,δ) ∈ P ×Q×∆L. Since utility functions can be perturbed without changing
their ﬁrst derivatives at the equilibrium allocation, we are able to change V i
s(p∗) for any
i ∈ I and for any s ∈ S, maintaining (  F,   Ψ)(p∗,q∗) unaltered at the CE prices (p∗,q∗).
Therefore, by applying a transversality argument, we know that σs(u,ω) is transverse to
zero for each (u,ω) ∈ Γ3, where Γ3 ⊂ Γ is a generic set. Now, given that the dimension of
the range of σs(u,ω) exceeds that of the domain, by applying the Regular Value Theorem,
σ−1
s (u,ω)(0) = ∅ for each (u,ω) ∈ Γ3. Therefore, Πs(p∗) has rank L for a generic set of
economies Γ3.
The result follows by noting that s was chosen arbitrarily. Q.E.D.
Notice that, if this property holds, then, for any given s ∈ S, the set of vectors
{V i1
s (p∗) − V i0
s (p∗),V i2
s (p∗) − V i0
s (p∗),...,V iL
s (p∗) − V i0
s (p∗)} span RL.
For i ∈ I \ {0}, a ∈ {0,1}, and s ∈ S, let κa,i
s (p∗) denote the vector, with LS
coordinates, obtained from ra ￿ [V i(p∗) − V 0(p∗)] by dropping the L coordinates that
correspond to state s.








is linearly independent for a CE price p∗ of an
economy in some generic set Γ4 ⊂ Γ.
Proof: Pick a state s ∈ S. We decompose the proof into two steps.
Step 1: From Assumption A.2 (iv) we know that the rank of each matrix of size (A +
1) × (A + 1) obtained by removing from matrix R any set of S − A rows equals A + 1.
Thus, any set of vectors obtained by considering, for each of the assets in A, the same
A + 1 coordinates of their corresponding vectors of payoﬀs is linearly independent. Since
A + 1 ≥ 2, we can choose two vectors from the set {r0,r1,...,rA} such that they are
linearly independent when restricted to any subset, of size A + 1, of their coordinates.
Furthermore, since S ≥ A+1, we know that these two vectors are also linearly independent
when restricted to S arbitrarily chosen coordinates. This result guarantees, in addition,
that not all the coordinates of any of the vectors derived in that way equal zero.6
Consider, without loss of generality, that r0,r1 ∈ RS+1 are the vectors chosen as
described above. It follows that the vectors κ0,1
s (p∗),κ1,1
s (p∗) are linearly independent since
by multiplying r0 and r1 by [V 1(p∗) − V 0(p∗)] according to the box product, the vectors
r0 and r1 are aﬀected by the same proportion in the same coordinates so that no relative
change across the coordinates is induced.
Step 2: Deﬁne the matrix Σs(p∗) :=
 
κ0,1




, of dimension LS ×
(I + 1). Also, let βs : P × Q × ∆I+1 → RL(S+1) × RA × RLS be the function speciﬁed by
βs(p,q,δ) :=
 
(  F,   Ψ)(p,q),Σs(p
∗)   δ
 
for each (p,q,δ) ∈ P×Q×∆I+1. Since we can perturb utility functions in a way such that
[V i(p∗) − V 0(p∗)], and thus also κ0,i
s (p∗) and κ1,1
s (p∗), for each i ∈ I \ {0}, are changed,
maintaining (  F,   Ψ)(p∗,q∗) unaﬀected at the CE prices (p∗,q∗), we obtain that βs(u,ω) ⋔ 0
for each (u,ω) ∈ Γ4, where Γ4 ⊂ Γ is a generic set. Now, since the dimension of the range
of βs(u,ω) exceeds that of the domain, for each (u,ω) ∈ Γ4 there is no δ ∈ ∆I such that
Σs(p∗)   δ = 0 so that rank[Σs(p∗)] = I + 1.
The result yields since state s was chosen arbitrarily. Q.E.D.
Remark 4: Since the linear independence property in Proposition 4 is stated for at
least LS of the coordinates of the vectors in a set of size I+1, then I+1 ≤ LS appears as
6In their proof GP claim that by assuming that there exists a portfolio θ ∈ RA+1 such that r(s) θ  = 0
for each s ∈ S, and (possibly) by relabelling assets, one obtains that r0(s)  = 0 for each s ∈ S. However,










is linearly independent, that there exists a portfolio θ = (1,1) such that r(s)   θ  = 0 for each s = 0,1,2,
and that yet not all the coordinates of the two payoﬀ vectors are diﬀerent from zero. Nevertheless, the
proof does not make use neither of that assumption nor of that result stated by GP.
12a necessary condition for this result to hold. By assuming that I < LS, such a condition is
satisﬁed. CKV do not impose an upper bound on the number of agents. They can achieve
the constrained suboptimality result so long as they consider a policy with lump-sum
transfers among agents in period 0. This allows them to control directly the income eﬀect
vectors of the agents. Without direct transfers of goods, since the welfare of agents is
aﬀected by inducing changes in L(S + 1) relative prices, it is clear that there must be
a bound on the number of agents. Indeed Mas-Colell (1987) provides an example that
shows that Theorem 1 does not hold if the upper bound on I is removed.
5. MARGINAL UTILITY OF INCOME
In this section we obtain two properties of the agents’ marginal utilities of income.
The ﬁrst of them shows that, generically, the agents’ ratios of marginal utilities across
states do not coincide, a fact that is strictly derived from the market incompleteness. This
fact also drives the result stated in the second property.
Proposition 5: Assume A.1, A.2 (i), (iii), and (iv), then, at each CE of an economy










for each i,j ∈ I, such that i  = j and each s,s′ ∈ S such that s  = s′.
Proof: Deﬁne the set YR :=
 
y ∈ RS+1 : y   R = [0]T 
. From Assumption A.2 (i) and
(iii), we know that rank(R) = A + 1 and S + 1 > A + 1 so that YR is generated by a
vector space of dimension greater than or equal to one. Fix an arbitrary ˜ s ∈ S, consider
a subset of A + 1 states   S ⊂ S \ {˜ s}, ordered as s0,s1,...,sA, set   ms := 0 for each
s / ∈   S such that s  = ˜ s, and let   m˜ s  = 0 be an arbitrary number. Then, the equation
−  y˜ s  r(˜ s) =
 
s∈ b S   ys  r(s) has a solution since, by Assumption A.2 (iv), each set of A+1
vectors that can be extracted from the set {r(0),r(1),...,r(S)} is linearly independent
so that they span RA+1. It follows that we can pick a vector   y ∈ YR \ {0} even though at
least one coordinate is arbitrarily pre-speciﬁed.
Now, consider a CE of an economy (u,ω) ∈ Γ. For an agent i ∈ I, we have that
 i∗[q∗]T = λi∗   R speciﬁes the condition (c1) obtained earlier for his optimal choice of an
asset portfolio. Take two agents, i,j ∈ I, i  = j, and two states s,s′ ∈ S, s  = s′. Perturb the
utility function of agent i in a way such that a vector denoted by η = (η0,η1,...,ηS) ∈ Rn,
where ηs := (η0s,η1s,...,ηLs) for each s ∈ S, is added to the derivative Dxiui(xi∗), and,
accordingly, the vector λi∗ is perturbed by the addition of a vector ∆λi. Using condition
(c2), obtained earlier, for the optimal choice of goods of agent i we know that the vectors
η and ∆λi must satisfy the equality η = p∗ ￿∆λi.
By the properties of the set YR, it is possible to choose a ∆λi ∈ MR such that either
∆λi
s  = 0 or ∆λi
s′  = 0. We use this to construct the utility perturbation described above.
13That perturbation does not aﬀect the optimal choice of assets of agent i since
(λ
i∗ + ∆λ
i)   R = λ
i∗   R + ∆λ
i   R = λ
i∗   R + [0]
T = λ
i∗   R.
In addition, we must compensate the change induced in the demand of agent i. We do
this by adding the appropriate amount to his vector of endowments ωi so as to leave his
excess demand unaﬀected.





















ss′ : P × Q × ∆2 → RL(S+1) × RA × R2 be the function speciﬁed by
ϕ
ij




for each (p,q,δ) ∈ P × Q × ∆2. Since the perturbation of utilities and endowments




∗) leaving (  F,   Ψ)(p∗,q∗) unaﬀected at the CE
prices (p∗,q∗), then ϕ
ij
ss′(u,ω) ⋔ 0 for each (u,ω) ∈ Γ5, where Γ5 ⊂ Γ is a generic set. Now,
since the dimension of the range of ϕ
ij
ss′(u,ω) exceeds that of the domain, by applying the
Regular Value Theorem, we obtain that, for such a set of economies, there is no δ ∈ ∆2
such that δ   Υ
ij
ss′(p∗) = [0]T, i.e., the rank of matrix Υ
ij
ss′(p∗) is 2, as required. Q.E.D.
Proposition 6: Assume A.1, A.2 (i), (iii), and (iv), then, given δ := (δi0,δi1,...,δiL) ∈
∆L+1 such that δi0  = 0, there exists a set of L + 1 agents, {i0,i1,...,iL} ⊂ I, such that,
at each CE of an economy in a generic set Γ5 ∈ Γ, we have 0  = δi0λi0
s
∗  = δimλim
s
∗ for at
least S states, for each m ∈ {1,2,...,L}.
Proof: Since, from Assumption A.1, the problem (P) has only interior solutions, then
λi
s
∗  = 0 for each i ∈ I and each s ∈ S at a CE.
Consider an agent i0 ∈ I, a subset of states ˜ S ⊂ S such that # ˜ S := S, and pick a
δ := (δi0,δi1,...,δiL) ∈ ∆L+1 such that δi0  = 0. By assuming that I ≥ 2L, we are able to
either
(a) extract from I\{i0} a set of agents {i1,i2,...,iL} ⊂ I\{i0} for which δi0λi0
s
∗  = δimλim
s
∗
for each m ∈ {1,2,...,L} and each s ∈ ˜ S, so that the result stated in Proposition 6 holds,
or









, for each m ∈ {1,2,...,L}, for some ¯ s ∈ ˜ S. Then, by using the result stated in
















∗ for each m ∈ {1,2,...,L}, for each s ∈ S \ {¯ s},
and for each (u,ω) ∈ Γ5. Therefore, by specifying the set ¯ S := S \ {¯ s}, we obtain that
δi0λi0
s
∗  = δimλim
s
∗ for each m ∈ {1,2,...,L}, for each s ∈ ¯ S, for each (u,ω) ∈ Γ5, as
required. Q.E.D.
6. A RESULT FROM LINEAR ALGEBRA
We will exploit the following Lemma in the next section.
14Lemma 1: Given a set of L non-zero numbers {a0,a1,...,aL} such that a0  = am
for each m ∈ {1,2,...,L}, and a set of L linearly independent vectors of dimension L,




m=1 amαmυm, of dimension L, can be gener-
ated by suitably choosing the set of numbers {α1,α2,...,αL}.
Proof: (GP)
7. PROOF OF THE RESULT
In this section we provide the proof of Theorem 1 by making use of the various argu-
ments presented up to now.
First, we specify the generic set of economies that are strongly regular, Proposition 2,
and for which the results stated in Proposition 3, Proposition 4, and Proposition 6 are
satisﬁed as   Γ := ∩5
k=2Γk.
Consider a CE (x∗,θ∗,p∗,q∗) of a given economy (u,ω) ∈   Γ. Let us recall that the
key procedure to prove Theorem 1 is to show that the matrix Φ(x∗,p∗,θ∗) deﬁned in
section 3 has full rank for a generic set of economies. Since we are interested in proving a
generic feature, we need to perturb the economy (u,ω). We do this by setting an additive
perturbation that induces (u,ω) to move to a neighboring economy, that is,
(u,ω)  −→ (u,ω) + (∆u,∆ω),
where ∆ω and ∆u denote, respectively, the perturbation to endowments and the pertur-
bation to utilities.
Let us describe ﬁrst the perturbation to endowments.
Consider a set of L + 1 agents {i0,i1,...,iL} ⊂ I and a subset of states ˜ S ⊂ S,
# ˜ S = S, ordered as s1,...,sS. Set {¯ s} := S \ ˜ S. Consider, for each s ∈ ˜ S, an arbitrary
set of numbers {γ1s,γ2s,...,γLs}. Then, the vector ∆ω is speciﬁed as:
(a) ∆ωi := 0 for each i / ∈ {i0,i1,...,iL},






























¯ s := 0,


































¯ s := 0.
In addition, for each m ∈ {0,1,...,L} and each s ∈ ˜ S, ∆ω
im











15so that the income of agent im in state s ∈ ˜ S remains unaﬀected.
For i ∈ I, let ∆  zi denote the change induced in the excess demand of agent i by
the perturbation of endowments. We note that the perturbation to endowments does not
change the optimal choices of any agent since it leaves unaﬀected the budget constraints
of the agents in each state. Also, it satisﬁes
(i) ∆  zi = 0 for each i / ∈ {i0,i1,...,iL},
(ii) ∆  zim
s = γms [V im
s (p∗) − V i0
s (p∗)] for each m ∈ {1,2,...,L} and each s ∈ ˜ S,
(iii) ∆  zi0
s = −
 L
m=1 γms [V im
s (p∗) − V i0
s (p∗)] for each s ∈ ˜ S, and
(iv) ∆  z
im
¯ s = 0 for each m ∈ {0,1,...,L}.
These changes on the excess demands of the agents translate into a change of the matrix
ψ(x∗) which we denote by ∆ψ(x∗). Then, for an arbitrary vector δ := (δ0,δ1,...,δI) ∈
∆I+1 we obtain the change induced in δ     λ∗   ψ(x∗) by the speciﬁed perturbation on
endowments as
δ     λ










im∗   ∆  z
im
since ∆  zi = 0 for each i / ∈ {i0,i1,...,iL}.
Upon substituting for each ∆  zim, we obtain
δ     λ



































































































































so that there are S + 1 blocks of L dimensional row vectors of which one block, the one
that corresponds to state ¯ s, is a vector of zeros.
16We recall that to complete the proof of Theorem 1 we must demonstrate that, for a
generic set of economies, there is no δ ∈ ∆I+1 such that
δ   Φ(x
∗,p
∗,θ
∗) = δ     λ
∗   ψ(x
∗) ￿[Dp   G(p
∗,θ
∗)]
−1   A(p
∗) = [0]
T.
So, let δ ∈ ∆I+1 be such that δi0 > 0 for some i0 ∈ I. Use the result in Proposi-
tion 6 to specify a set of L + 1 agents, denoted {i0,i1,...,iL}, and a set of states ˜ S,
such that 0  = δi0λi0
s
∗  = δimλim
s
∗ for each s ∈ ˜ S and each m ∈ {1,2,...,L}. Use
the speciﬁed set of agents and the set ˜ S of states to construct the endowment per-
turbation speciﬁed above with {γ1s,γ2s,...,γLs}, s ∈ ˜ S, being arbitrary numbers. For
each s ∈ ˜ S, apply Lemma 1 with δimλim
s
∗ playing the role of am, m ∈ {0,1,...,L},
with {γ1s,γ2s,...,γLs} playing the role of {α1,α2,...,αL}, and with the set of vectors
{V i1
s (p∗) − V i0
s (p∗),V i2
s (p∗) − V i0
s (p∗),...,V iL
s (p∗) − V i0
s (p∗)} playing the role of {v1,...,vL}.
The Lemma can be applied by invoking the spanning result obtained Proposition 3. It
follows that any vector δ     λ∗   ∆ψ(x∗) with LS non-zero coordinates can be generated
by suitably picking the set of numbers {γ1s,γ2s,...,γLs} for each s ∈ ˜ S since LS of its
coordinates can be controlled independently.
The perturbation of endowments speciﬁed above also changes the matrix Dp   G(p∗,θ∗)
which we now analyze. Consider a given state s ∈ ˜ S. For i ∈ I, let ∆Dps[  gi
s(p∗,θi∗) −   ωi
s]
and ∆Dps   Gs(p∗,θ∗) denote the changes induced, respectively, in the matrices Dps[  gi
s(p∗,θi∗)−
  ωi
s] and Dps   Gs(p∗,θ∗), by the perturbation of endowments. The Slutsky decomposition of
the matrix Dps[  gi































s(p∗) for i ∈ I and s ∈ S are not aﬀected by the speciﬁed perturbation of endow-
ments since income, and hence demand, are not aﬀected. Now, by making use of the
induced changes to the excess demands of the agents, ∆  zi
s, and the fact that, for s ∈ S,
∆Dps   Gs(p∗,θ∗) =
 
i ∆Dps[  gi
s(p∗,θi∗) −   ωi
s], we obtain that





































































ls (p∗)] as b
im
ls for each
m ∈ {1,2,...,L} and each l ∈ L \ {0}. By writing out the product above, we obtain the
7See, e.g., Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1980).
17matrix of dimension L × L,

































































which happens to be symmetric.
Let us now describe the perturbation to utilities, ∆u. Consider an agent i ∈ I, and
construct ∆u by placing a quadratic term, that we now describe, in the coordinate that
corresponds to agent i, and by placing zeros in the other coordinates. This quadratic term
is such that the linear term subsequently added to the vectors of ﬁrst derivatives of ui
amounts to zero at the CE. Hence, it leaves aggregate demand unaﬀected, but changes
the matrix of second derivatives of ui.8 Furthermore, this quadratic term induces, for each
s ∈ S, a change in the matrix Ki
s(p∗) by the addition of a symmetric matrix that cancels
out with the matrix in (10) above.
Since, from Assumption A.3, a variation of ps only aﬀects excess demand at state s,
we have that the perturbation (∆u,∆ω) speciﬁed above is such that [Dp   G(p∗,θ∗)]−1 is
not changed. Therefore, it generates the vector δ    λ∗  ∆ψ(x∗) ￿[Dp   G(p∗,θ∗)]−1 as desired
for at least LS of its coordinates. Now, from the result stated in Proposition 4, any
matrix obtained from A(p∗) by dropping the vectors that correspond to any state has at
least I + 1 linearly independent rows and thus we can choose the perturbation (∆u,∆ω)
as to generate non-zero entries in those components of δ     λ∗   ψ(x∗) ￿[Dp   G(p∗,θ∗)]−1
that correspond to some set of I + 1 linearly independent rows from A(p∗). It follows
that δ     λ∗   ψ(x∗) ￿[Dp   G(p∗,θ∗)]−1   A(p∗)  = [0]T is guaranteed. Then, by applying a
transversality argument, we obtain that δ   Φ(x∗,p∗,θ∗)  = [0]T for each (u,ω) ∈ ˜ Γ, where
˜ Γ ⊂   Γ is a generic set.
Since δ was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that the matrix Φ(x∗,p∗,θ∗) has rank I + 1
for a generic set of economies ˜ Γ. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark 5: The GP result holds for a generic set of economies. Of course, there are
non-generic economies for which some CE are not CS. As in GP, consider an economy
(u,ω) ∈ Γ for which there is a CE such that no agent trades any good at any state. Then,
clearly, the last term in equation (3) amounts to zero and, therefore, the contribution to
the change of utility of each agent due to the change in relative prices vanishes. So, given
a reallocation of asset holdings dθ, du(x∗) only captures the eﬀect of a pure redistribution
of income and, therefore, no improvement can be induced. However, we know that the
economy (u,ω) belongs to a non-generic set since, by changing slightly the parameter ω,
we move to a new economy such that some agents trade at each CE, which implies that
the set that contains (u,ω) is not open.
8It is known that by adding a suitable quadratic term to ui, one can induce any perturbation of the
matrix Ki
s(p∗), for i ∈ I and s ∈ S, by the addition of a symmetric matrix. See, e.g., Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1980).
18Remark 6: One would like to know whether the bound on the number of agents is
tight. If LS < I+1 ≤ L(S+1), then the argument given to prove Theorem 1 fails to hold.
To see this notice that, since the result obtained in Proposition 6 is in terms of ratios
across states, one state must be dropped and used as a reference. Therefore, we are able
only to control LS coordinates of the vector δ     λ∗   ∆ψ(x∗). Therefore, to show that the
matrix Φ(x∗,p∗,θ∗) has rank I + 1, the set of vectors  
r0 ￿[V 1(p∗) − V 0(p∗)],r0 ￿[V I(p∗) − V 0(p∗)],r1 ￿[V 1(p∗) − V 0(p∗)]
 
needs to be linearly independent when considering any LS coordinates of them, which
can be achieved only if I + 1 ≤ LS, a condition which is satisﬁed by imposing I < LS as
stated in the hypotheses of Theorem 1.
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